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Abstract—Even though the field of Face Presentation Attack 
Detection (PAD) has been around for quite a long time, but still 
it is quite a new field to be implemented on smartphones. 
Implementation on smartphones is different because the limited 
computing power of the smartphones when compared to 
computers. Presentation Attack for a face recognition system 
may happen in various ways, using photograph, video or mask 
of an authentic user’s face. The Presentation Attack Detection 
system is vital to counter those kinds of intrusion. Face 
presentation attack countermeasures are categorized as sensor 
level or feature level. Face Presentation Attack Detection 
through the sensor level technique involved in using additional 
hardware or sensor to protect recognition system from spoofing 
while feature level techniques are purely software-based 
algorithms and analysis. Under the feature level techniques, it 
may be divided into liveness detection; motion analysis; face 
appearance properties (texture analysis, reflectance); image 
quality analysis (image distortion); contextual information; 
challenge response. There are a few types of research have been 
done for face PAD on smartphones. They also have released the 
database they used for their testing and performance 
benchmarking. 
 
Index Terms—Anti-spoofing; Face Recognition; Presentation 
Attack Countermeasures; Presentation Attack Detection. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Personal authentication using biometrics technologies have 
nowadays evolved into getting as a way of life. It is getting 
important in every aspect of our life. One of the essential 
expect in our life is our smartphone. We do everything on our 
smartphone. Protecting smartphones using biometrics such as 
fingerprint and face unlock are available now. The ability to 
use our smartphone for mobile payment using biometric 
fingerprint is also possible now with the Apple Pay and 
Samsung Pay.  In the future, there will be much more security 
critical application will run on our phone and require our 
biometric traits. With this advancement, there is a possibility 
these systems may be fooled or spoofed. The need to protect 
the system from spoofing is also increasingly important and 
should be looked into thoroughly.   ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 37 
overlooked the biometric since 2002.  In 2016, they 
introduced a new standard for anti-spoofing. It is officially 
known as ISO/IEC 30107-1:2016 Information technology -- 
Biometric presentation attack detection -- Part 1: Framework.  
Presentation Attack Detection for face authentication on a 
smartphone has recently been attracting researchers and begin 
to get traction. This is the future way to go. It is not just for 
phone unlocking only, but apps using it as well. This paper 
will be looking into what kind of presentation attack detection 
for face authentication on smartphones has been researched 
all this while. 
 
II. PRESENTATION AND THE PRESENTATION ATTACK 
INSTRUMENTS 
 
Generally, in a biometric system, presentation is a process 
of presenting the user trait to the sensor. For a face 
recognition system, this is a process of presenting the face of 
a person to the camera. When a genuine user presented his/her 
face to the camera, the system will allow access for that user. 
However, an unauthorized user may try to access the system 
by trying to impersonate a real genuine user. This is known 
as presentation attack. Presentation attack may be carried out 
by various means. All those means are to fool the system into 
thinking that the genuine user is accessing the system. 
Presentation Attack Instruments (PAI) are the tools used to 
attack the face recognition system. PAI is classified into two: 
Artificial or Human. Figure 1 breaks down all the PAI for a 
face recognition system.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Presentation Attack Instruments for Face Recognition System 
 
 Artificial Presentation Attack Instruments 
Under the Artificial PAI, classification can be made as 
Complete or Partial. Partial include using 2D photo print-out 
with eye holes. For Complete Artificial PAI, it can be either 
2D or 3D. 
 
 Photo Presentation Attack Instruments 
These attacks are carried out using a photograph of a real 
user. By far, this is the most common kind of attack 
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considering that it is easier to source for a photo of the real 
user. The photograph is shown to the camera in order to fool 
the system into thinking that the real user is present in front 
of the camera. The photograph of the real user may be taken 
by the attacker using a digital camera or easily obtained on 
online social media such as Facebook, Instagram, Twitter, etc 
[1].  
The photograph of the real user then can either be printed 
onto a piece of paper or displayed on a screen of digital 
devices such as mobile phone, tablets, and laptop [2][3]. 
The life-size face print-out can be put on the imposter’s 
face. Cutting through around the eyes of the print-out will 
make eye blinking detection possible [4]. Figure 2(a) shows 
how a presentation attack using a photo print-out. 
 
 Video Presentation Attack Instruments 
Instead of using still photos, an imposter may attack the 
system by playing back a recorded video of a real user. The 
video can be played on mobile screen, tablet, or laptop and 
ultrabooks. This method is also known as replay attacks. [4] 
[5] [6]. Figure 2(b) shows how a presentation attack using a 
video replay. 
 
 Mask Presentation Attack Instruments 
A more challenging kind of attack is the mask attack. Mask 
can be produced from various kind of material. It will 
replicate the face of a real user. A real face can also be 
produced by a 3D printer. This is also considered as mask 
attack [7] [8] [9]. Anybody can have a face mask of another 
person by having that person’s frontal photo and side photos. 
This service is provided by thatmyface.com [10]. Figure 2(c) 
shows how a presentation attack using a mask. 
 
   
(a) (b) (c) 
 
Figure 2: (a) An example of presentation attack using a print-out photo. 
Photo from IDIAP website. (b) An example of presentation attack using 
video replay on a mobile device [8]. (c) An example of a mask used for 
face spoofing. Photo from University Oulu, Finland website 
 
 Human Presentation Attack Instruments 
Human PAIs are very difficult and might be impossible to 
detect. The following falls under the Human PAI category: 
• Lifeless –  Using the actual face of the dead person or 
cadaver 
• Altered – Make use of plastic surgery to alter/modify 
an imposter face to look like the real user face. 
• Non-Conformant – facial expression/extreme. 
• Coerced –The real genuine user is unconscious, 
under duress 
• Conformant – zero effort impostor attempt 
 
The Human PAI is out of the scope of this paper and will 
not be discussed any further.  
 
III. PRESENTATION ATTACK DETECTION 
 
Presentation Attack Detection (PAD) is the 
countermeasure to detect and defeat presentation attacks to a 
biometric system. For a face recognition system, the 
presentation attack detection will try to detect and defeat all 
of the attacks as mentioned previously. In general, PAD will 
try to differentiate between access by a real genuine user and 
an imposter trying to access the system by using other means.   
PAD does not work on its own, it is used in conjunction 
with a face recognition system. It is to authenticate the face 
used by the recognition process is a real person face and not 
fake faces. Figure 3 shows the PAD and Face Recognition 
system working together. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Combination of PAD and face Recognition system to make a 
complete system 
 
IV. CATEGORY PRESENTATION ATTACK DETECTION 
 
Many types of research have been done by various groups 
in this area and may method and algorithms has been 
proposed. Out of all the method proposed and developed, it is 
categorized into two very basic categories: sensor-level and 
feature-level. See Figure 4. 
 
 
 
Figure 4: The Basic Presentation Attack Detection Techniques 
 
Sensor-Level Techniques. It is also known as hardware-
based techniques. This technique will require additional 
sensor besides a camera in order to detect another trait of a 
user. This may include facial thermogram, blood pressure, 
fingerprint sweat, gait etc. For an example, please refer  [11] 
and [12]. 
 
Feature-Level Techniques. It is also known as software-
based techniques. It will rely on algorithms to detect 
presentation attack and does not include any additional sensor 
beside the standard camera. 
 
This article will focus on the Feature-Level Techniques of 
PAD because a standard smartphone is equipped with 
cameras (front and back) only. It does now have any other 
sensor. 
 
V. FEATURE-LEVEL PRESENTATION ATTACK DETECTION 
TECHNIQUES 
 
These are basically the face presentation attack detection 
techniques which purely rely on algorithm and software:  
• liveness detection  
• motion analysis  
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• face appearance properties (texture analysis, 
reflectance) 
• image quality analysis (image distortion) 
• contextual information  
• challenge response 
 
 Liveness Detection 
This kind of PAD technique is utilised in [4], [13], [14]. 
This is the most elementary and common technique. It will 
try to detect physiological signs of life in the face captured by 
the camera.  Detection includes eye blinking, facial 
expression changes, head movement and mouth movements 
[15]. This technique may be best dealing with photograph 
based spoofing but not very suitable for video playback 
spoofing since it can be replicated in a video.  
 
 Motion Analysis 
In general, this technique will try to detect spontaneous 
movement clues generated when 2D spoof photo or video are 
presented to the camera. [16] 
The analysis is based on series of images captured by the 
camera and to compare the movement of planar objects such 
as photographs and video playback which is different with a 
real face. Assuming that facial parts in real faces do not move 
the same as on photographs, the optical flow-based method 
can capture and track the subtle relative movements between 
different facial parts to determine spoofing [17]. 
 
 Facial Appearance Properties 
This presentation attack detection technique will analyse 
facial appearance properties such as the face reflectance and 
the face texture. The reflectance and texture of a real face are 
different compared to a spoof face.  
 
 Image Quality Analysis   
This technique will try to detect the presence of image 
distortion usually found in the spoofed face.  
 
Colour Distortion. Colour distribution may be different 
between face printed on a paper, face displayed on mobile 
devices and a real face [18]. Those differences can be 
analysed to determine face spoofing. 
 
Moiré Pattern. During various image acquisition and image 
display process, undesired aliasing of images was produced. 
Moiré patterns are actually pattern produced when two or 
more patterns are overlapping on top of each other, which will 
result in the appearance of the new third pattern. Photo of a 
face printed using CYMK, photos and videos displayed on 
mobile devices display will exhibit this Moiré patterns [19]. 
Figure 5 displays the Moiré pattern produced. 
 
Face Shape Deformation. This is especially true in the case 
of print attacks. The photo might be bend while an imposter 
holding it and this may skew the shape of the spoof face. 
 
 Contextual Information   
When trying to detect presentation attack, it is also 
important to analyse the scene and the environment as well. 
This technique will look for any abnormality within the 
scene, in particular, a person holding a mobile device or a 
piece of paper with a photo of a face [20].  
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Example of Moiré patterns due to the overlapping of digital grids. 
(a) Portion of the Lena test image. (b) Photograph of (a) on a 13-inch 
MacBook Pro screen and shot by an iPhone 4 camera without any 
compression artifacts. (c)-(d) Details of (a)-(b), respectively 
 
 Challenge Response   
This technique of PAD requires the user to respond to the 
“challenge” instructed by the system. The system may request 
the user to “blink left eye” or “rotate the head clockwise”.  
 
VI. PRESENTATION ATTACK DETECTION ON SMARTPHONES 
 
While there has been a lot of research in this area of 
Presentation Attack Detection, not many were emphasized 
for smartphone and mobile devices. Only in the last couple of 
years, research based on smartphone and mobile device PAD 
are gaining popularity.  
Many different algorithms have been developed and these 
algorithms are tested to gauge the performance level. Besides 
the finding or the outcome of the research, the researchers 
also release database or dataset that they used during their 
test. These databases are publicly available and can be used 
by other researchers to gauge their own algorithm 
performance 
This section will look at those research that has been done, 
the techniques and methods they use, the performance of their 
algorithm and the database they have released. 
  
 MSU Mobile Face Spoofing Database (MSU MFSD) 
This database is produced as part of research in [18]. It 
proposed the use of Image Distortion Analysis techniques in 
detecting presentation attack.  Specifically, it will detect 
presentation attack by analysing for the following: 
• Specular Reflection Features 
• Blurriness Features 
• Chromatic Moment Features Recaptured 
• Color Diversity Features Another 
 
The techniques employed here are based on Image Quality 
Analysis category. In this case, it will look for spoofing by 
detecting for any distortion in the image as mentioned above. 
The publicly available MSU MFSD Database for face 
spoof attack consists of 280 video clips of photo and video 
attack attempts to 35 clients. 
For data collection for this database, two type of cameras 
that were used: 
i. built-in webcam in MacBook Air 13” (640x480); 
ii. front-facing camera in the Google Nexus 5 Android 
phone (720x480) 
 
For this database, three types of spoofing attack medium 
are used:  
i. iPad 
ii. iPhone 
iii. printed photo 
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Information on how to obtain the MSU Mobile Face 
Spoofing Database is available from the Michigan State 
University website [21]. 
 
 MSU Unconstrained Smartphone Spoof Attack 
Database (MSU USSA) 
This database is produced as part of research [22]. It 
proposed the following methods: 
• reject options using Interpupillary Distance (IPD) 
constraint and bezel detection 
• fusion of Local Binary Pattern (LBP) and Colour 
Moments 
 
The techniques employed here are a combination of texture 
analysis and image analysis techniques. It also includes IPD 
calculation in order to detect spoofing, because a person 
holding a printed photography might accidentally bend the 
photo making the pupil distance between the two eyes not 
equal. It will also detect for any bezel that might have a 
printed photograph.  
The main purpose of this MSU USSA database is to 
simulate spoof attacks on smartphones. The MSU USSA 
database makes sure that it contains a mixture of 
environments, image qualities, image capture devices and 
subject diversity.  A total of 1,000 live subject images of 
celebrities from the Weakly Labeled Face Database are 
selected. Therefore, the public set of the MSU USSA 
database for face spoofing all together consist of 9,000 
images (1,000 live subject and 8,000 spoof attack) of the 
1,000 subjects. 
 For data collection for this database, two type of cameras 
that were used: 
i. Front-facing camera in the Google Nexus 5 
Android phone (1280 × 960). 
ii. Rear-facing camera in the Google Nexus 5 Android 
phone (3264 × 2448). 
 
Information on how to obtain the MSU Unconstrained 
Smartphone Spoof Attack Database (MSU USSA) is 
available from the Michigan State University website [23]. 
 
 IDIAP Replay-Mobile Database  
This database is produced as part of  [24] research. It 
proposed the following methods:  
• Image Quality Measures 
• Using Gabor-jets texture-descriptor 
 
The techniques used are combinations of the Image Quality 
Analysis category and combined with Texture Analysis. The 
image is analysed with various quality measures to determine 
spoofing. 
The Replay-Mobile Database contains spoof attacks with a 
total of 1190 video clips of photos and videos under different 
lighting conditions to 40 clients. Those videos were recorded 
with using an iPad Mini2 running iOS and an LG-G4 
smartphone running Android. The IDIAP Replay-Mobile 
Database is available for download from the Idiap Research 
Institute [25].  
 
 MSU Replay-Attack for Smartphones (RAFS) 
This database is part of research in [7]. The proposed 
method used in the research is the Moiré Pattern Analysis 
with the following:  
• Multi-scale LBP (MLBP)  
• Densely Sampled SIFT (DSIFT) 
• Combination of MLBP and DSIFT 
 
The research utilises Texture Analysis methods. Image are 
analyse using MLBP, DSIFT and combination of both.   
The RAFS (Replay-Attack for Smartphones) is an 
extension of MSU Mobile Face Spoofing Database (MFSD) 
by capturing replay attacks using smartphones. It contains 
165 videos from 55 subjects. From the total 165 videos, 55 
videos are live face videos from the MSU MFSD that are 
captured using the front-facing camera on a Google Nexus 5 
in a controlled background environment. The remaining 110 
(2×55) videos are spoofed face videos which are captured by 
showing the live face videos on a MacBook screen 
(1280×800), and recapturing the face videos using the built-
in rear camera of Google Nexus 5 and built-in rear camera of 
iPhone 6, respectively. 
  
VII. EVALUATION OF PRESENTATION ATTACK DETECTION 
 
There are two types of error can be produced in a face PAD 
system: False Acceptance (FA) and False Rejection (FR). 
 The False Acceptance Rate, or FAR, is the probability that 
the anti-spoofing system will mistakenly accept an access 
attempt by an imposter using a spoof face. FAR is the 
equivalence to the ratio of the number of False Acceptances 
(FA) divided by the total number of spoofing attacks. 
The False Rejection Rate, or FRR, is the probability that 
the biometric security system will mistakenly reject an access 
attempt by a real user. FRR is the equivalence to the ratio of 
the number of False Rejections (FR) divided by the total 
number of genuine access. 
 
Table 1 
Relation Between False Acceptance, False Rejection, Spoofing Attack, 
Genuine Access and Face Presentation Attack Detection System 
Acceptance And Rejection 
 
 Presentation Attack/ 
Fake Face 
Genuine Access/ 
Real Face 
System Accept False Acceptance 
(FA) 
True Acceptance 
(TA) 
System Reject True Rejection 
(TR) 
False Rejection 
(FR) 
 
Two commonly indicator to measure the performance is to 
use the Half Total Error Rate (HTER) and Equal Error Rate 
(EER).  
Half Total Error Rate (HTER) is the average of False 
Acceptance Rate (FAR) and False Rejection Rate (FRR). 
Equal Error Rate (EER) is the rate at which the False 
Acceptance Rate (FAR) and the False Rejection Rate (FRR) 
are the same. This value is a single number that is sometimes 
used to compare matching performance between systems 
[26][27]. 
Besides the traditional False Acceptance Rate (FAR), False 
Rejection Rate (FRR), Equal Error Rate (EER), and Half 
Total Error Rate (HTER) used for evaluation, there are newer 
PAD evaluations based on ISO/IEC 30107-3 specifications: 
Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER), 
Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate (BPCER) 
and Average Classification Error Rate (ACER).  
Attack Presentation Classification Error Rate (APCER) is 
the proportion of attack presentations using the same PAI 
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species incorrectly classified as bona fide presentations in a 
specific scenario. 
Bona Fide Presentation Classification Error Rate 
(BPCER), also known as Normal Presentation Classification 
Error Rate (NPCER) is proportion of bona fide presentations 
incorrectly classified as attack presentations in a specific 
scenario. 
Average Classification Error Rate (ACER) is the mean of 
APCER and BPCER. To gauge the performance and 
effectiveness of a PAD algorithm, it is tested against the 
publicly available database. Besides the four databases that 
are already mentioned in the previous section, there are other 
databases which are not specific for smartphones but are used 
as a benchmark as well. Testing and benchmarking a PAD 
algorithm and method are usually done using intra-database 
itself and also cross-database with others. 
 
 Intra-database Testing 
The PAD algorithm and method are both trained and tested 
using the same database. The training and testing will most 
likely use the same spoof media, same camera, same 
environment, same lighting condition and same subjects. 
 
 Cross-database Testing  
In cross-database testing, the PAD algorithm and method 
are trained using one database and tested using another 
different database. The training and testing will most likely 
use different spoof media, different camera, different 
environment, different lighting condition and different 
subjects. Cross-database performance result is close to the 
real-world application, where a PAD algorithm needs to 
detect spoof media condition which it has not been trained 
for.   
 
 
Table 2 
Presentation Attack Detection on Smartphone - Performance Result  
 
DB Method/Techniques Intra-database Test Cross-database Test 
MSU 
MFSD 
Image Distortion 
Analysis 
IDIAP [5] 
HTER 
    (%) 
CASIA [6] 
ERR 
(%) 
MFSD 
ERR 
(%) 
IDIAP [5] (TRAIN) MFSD (TRAIN) 
MFSD (TEST) IDIAP [5] (TEST) 
TPR@F
AR=0.1 
TPR@FAR=
0.01 
TPR@FAR
=0.1 
TPR@FAR=
0.01 
7.41 13.3 
(30FRMS) 
12.9 
(75FRMS) 
8.58 
(35 SUBJECTS) 
5.82 
(55 SUBJECTS) 
75.5 29.8 73.7 38.6 
DB Method/Techniques Intra-database Test Cross-database Test 
MSU 
USSA 
Interpupillary Distance 
(IPD) constraint and 
bezel detection 
 
Local Binary Pattern 
(LBP) and Colour 
Moments 
IDIAP [5] 
HTER 
(%) 
CASIA 
FASD [6] 
ERR 
(%) 
MFSD 
ERR 
(%) 
USSA (TRAIN) 
TEST 
MSU 
MFSD 
IDIAP [5] CASIA 
FASD [6] 
 
Original Protocol 9.27% 
HTER 
3.50% 
HTER 
2.00% 
HTER 14.6 5.88 8.41 
Smartphone Unlock for face unlock 
0 1.67 2.67 
DB Method/Techniques Intra-database Test  
IDIAP 
REPLAY-
MOBILE 
 HTER 
(%) 
ACER 
(%) 
APCER 
(%) 
BPCER 
(%) 
 
IQM 7.8 13.64 19.87 7.40 
Gabor 9.13 9.53 7.91 11.15 
DB Method/Techniques Intra-database Test Cross-database Test 
MSU 
RAFS 
Multi-scale LBP 
(MLBP)  
 
Densely Sampled 
SIFT (DSIFT) 
IDIAP [5] 
HTER 
(%) 
CASIA[6] 
HTER 
(%) 
RAFS 
HTER 
(%) 
IDIAP 
[5] 
HTER 
(%) 
CASIA [6] 
HTER 
(%) 
RAFS 
HTER 
(%) 
 
3.3% 0.0 11.3 18.0 49.0 11.4  
 
VIII. PERFORMANCE OF PRESENTATION ATTACK 
DETECTION ON SMARTPHONES 
 
Table 2 summarized the performance results of PAD 
algorithms on a smartphone that have been presented in the 
earlier section. 
From all we have seen, still, there isn’t single method that 
can claim it is superior to the other methods. While some 
performed good with a certain database, it may not be 
performing well with others. Some method gets a good result 
in an intra-database testing but did not get a good result in a 
cross-database testing environment. Even for an intra-
database testing, different results are obtained with testing 
with a different database. 
 
 
 
IX. CONCLUSION 
 
A lot of research has been done in this field of face 
presentation attack detection in general. Face presentation 
attack detection for a smartphone is quite new and has now 
been the focus of many research groups. Different techniques 
and methods have been introduced.  
This paper has presented the various research that have 
been done for presentation attack detection on smartphones 
and explained their techniques and method. 
From the result comparison, it shows that a lot of research 
in presentation attack detection countermeasure is still 
needed.  
All of the research presented are tested with images of 
subjects taken mostly in controlled environment. We do not 
know how those methods will perform in the real world used 
by the real users as a complete biometrics system and used in 
different scenarios and environment. 
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The cross-database testing is a close representation of a 
real-world scenario usage. In a real-world scenario, it is 
impossible for us to train our algorithm with each and every 
different spoof material scenario (different camera, different 
environment, different lighting condition and different 
subjects).   
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